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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Loyola Marymount basketball star Hank Gathers collapsed in
the middle of a basketball game. Gathers died because of a heart disorder.
Other inter-collegiate athletes have died unexpectedly on the playing field
from similar physical conditions! Some universities have taken action to
avoid another Gathers story by preventing athletes with certain health
problems from participating actively in inter-collegiate athletics.2 Those
athletes affected by the universities' actions, however, have not accepted
1 J.D., May 1999, University of Miami School of Law. A.B., Harvard, 1996. This article was
prepared in the Spring of 1998 in conjunction with the author's J.D. studies.
I Dale Taylor, a Southern University linebacker, suffering from the same condition as Hank
Gathers, collapsed and died during conditioning drills. Associated Press, Southern University Linebacker
Dies During Practice, THE DETROIT NEwS, Jan. 28, 1998.
2 See Knapp v. Northwestern, 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); Pahulu v. University of Kansas,
897 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995). Athletes at these universities are allowed to maintain their scholarships
and receive all the other benefits shared by inter-collegiate athletes. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 477.
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restriction on participation idly. They have brought actions for injunctions
against the universities under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.3 The student-
athletes claim that they are disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act because, for them, athletics constitutes learning, a major life activity.4
Therefore, they argue that the universities violated the Act by imposing a
substantial limitation on a major life activity.5
Recent case law has been split on whether athletics is a major life activity6
and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue. The lower courts are
also split on the issue as to whether a subjective standard or an objective
standard should be applied in determiningwhether inter-collegiate athletics
is a major-life activity.7 The courts agree, though, that regardless of whether
athletics can be considered a major life activity, the athlete must be
"otherwise qualified,"" as set forth below.
The two leading cases on these issues, specifically in the arena of inter-
collegiate athletics, are Pahulu v. University of Kansas9 and Knapp v.
Northwestern University.'0 Knapp and Pahulu disagree on whether athletics
constitute a major life activity." However, both uphold the university's right
29 U.S.C. S 794(a)(1997). Neither claimant in Knapp or Pahulu, the only cases dealing
specifically with the issues raised in this Article, brought suit under the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Private universities are covered under Title 111 ofthe ADA, 42 U.S.C.S. 12181 (7)(j)(1997), and
public universities are covered under Title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.S. 12131 (1)(B) 1998.
The problem with this argument is that authority exists holding that, "[b]ecause of the
substantial similarity between the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, courts normally treat precedent under
the two statutes as interchangeable." See Valle v. The City of Chicago, 982 F.Supp. 560,562 n. 2 (1997),
citing to Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996). But cf. Amy L. Hennen, Protecting
Addicts in the Employment Arena: Chartering a Course Toward Tolerance, 15 LAW & INEQ. 157 (1997), citing
to Kathy A. Wolverton, Protecting Alcoholics Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and New York law: A
Statutory Tug of War, 57 ALB. L. REV. 527, 541 (1993) (questioning the value of applying cases under the
Rehabilitation Act and those under the ADA interchangeably because the Rehabilitation Act only applies
to the federal government and employers receiving federal assistance and the ADA applies to the private
as well as the public sector). In addition, case law in the athletic and academic setting has also applied
the ADA. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 1998 WL 67529 (D.Or.); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n (MHSSA), 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); McPherson v. MHSAA, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1997). Thus, why claims where not brought under the ADA is an open question. Nevertheless, for
purposes of this article, the analysis will focus on the Rehabilitation Act.
4 See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473; Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. 1387.
5 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1390,1391; Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478,479.
6 See Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1393; Knapp, 101 F. 3d at 481.
See id. at 1392,1393; id at 481.
8 See id. at 1389, citing to 29 U.S.C. S 794 and Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys. E. & Middle
Am., Inc., 651 F.Supp. 340,341 (D.Kan. 1987); Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478, citing to Byrne v. Bd. ofEduc.,
Sch. ofW. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1992).
9 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. 1387.
10 Knapp, 101 F.3d 473.
11 See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473, 481; Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. 1387, 1393.
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to prevent the athlete from competing because the athlete was not
"otherwise qualified" for the position sought. 2 These cases demonstrate
that only after concluding that an athlete is otherwise qualified, taking into
account the risk of future injury, does it become necessary to address
whether athletics constitutes a major life activity.
However, both cases fail to adequately frame their opinions. They
present an otherwise qualified analysis that does not fully address a second
and interrelated issue: whether the university can reasonably accommodate
the athlete.13 Recently, the importance of the reasonable accommodation
analysis was demonstrated in the popular case of Martin v. PGA Tour.14 In
Martin, the court held the requested accommodation of a golf cart to assist
a professional golfer with a congenital deformity in his severely atrophied
right leg, which weakened during competition, was eminently reasonable
under the American With Disabilities Act." The Supreme Court also
recognized the importance of a university's ability to reasonably
accommodate a student in Southeastern Community College v. Davis. 6 Further,
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act provide
guidance as to what modifications post-secondary institutions are required
to make. 7
Once the othenvise qualified analysis and reasonable accommodation analysis
are satisfied, the courts can analyze which test should be applied in
12 See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473,482; Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. 1387, 1393.
13 See Patricia A. Solfaro, Civil Rights - Courts Should Use A Individualized Analysis When
Determining Whether To Grant A Waiver Of An Athletic Conference Age Eligibility Rule, 7 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 185 (1997), citing toJohnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F.Supp. 579, 584
(M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated in 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic
Conferences, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 663 (2d Cir. 1996). In deciding whether the plaintiffhas established a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits as to both the Rehabilitation Act claim and the
Americans with Disabilities Act claim, the most important issue is the "otherwise qualified" requirement
as supplemented by the "reasonable accommodation" requirement.
14 Martin, 1998 WL 67529.
1S Id. at *12.
16 In Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), a blind individual brought an
action against a university under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because
she was denied admission to nursing school because of a hearing disability, the Court held that her
disorder could not have been accommodated according to the Code of Federal Regulations'
requirements for post-secondary institutions on auxiliary aids. See 34 C.F.R. S 84.44 (1997). It also
would have imposed, contrary to the Rehabilitation Act's directives, substantial modifications to the
academic program and the curriculum. Davis, 442 U.S. at 405. Even though the court held that the
modifications necessary to accommodate a nurse applicant with a hearing disability was beyond those
required by the regulations because they would fundamentally alter the nature ofthe program, the court
also held that, "Identification ofthose instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs ofthe disabled
person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues to be an important responsibility."
Id. at 410, 413.
17 34 C.F.R. S 84.44 (1997).
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determining whether inter-collegiate athletics is a major life activity. There
are three approaches a court can take: a subjective test, which simply focuses
on the individual's feelings towards the role of athletics in his life; an
objective test that focuses on objective factors applicable to the individual;
or an objective test that focuses on objective factors applicable to the average
person. The purely subjective test is not applied. The test is not workable
because it puts in motion a slippery slope of ruling any activity a major life
activity simply because an individualfeels it is a major life activity. Courts
have chosen, and should choose, between the objective test as to the
individual' 8 and the objective test as to the average person, on which to base
their analysis. Case law applying the objective test as to the individual has
consistently argued that athletics could constitute a major life activity. The
objective test as to the average person has conventionally been applied by the
courts in arguing against classifying athletics as a major life activity.' 9
Only when the athlete can prove that he is otherwise qualified and the
university can reasonably accommodate him, should he be allowed to argue
that the objective test as to the individual is applicable in assessing whether
the sport is a major life activity for him. However, ifa court chooses to apply
the objective test as to the average person, an individualized inquiry as to the
objective value athletics has on the athlete's life would be irrelevant.
Regardless of the preliminary issues that need to be addressed, there is
no doubt that the question of whether inter-collegiate athletics constitute a
major life activity is a pressing issue that needs to be resolved. Resolving the
issue would be helpful in future cases similar to Pahulu and Knapp where an
athlete may be considered otherwise qualified and able to be reasonably
accommodated. In addition, the issues presented arise outside of the context
of inter-collegiate athletics in cases dealing with diseases and disorders
where one limitation on the claimant is that he is physically unable to
participate in athletics.2" Addressing whether inter-collegiate athletics is a
major life activity helps courts deal with claims under the Rehabilitation Act
factually different than those presented in this article.
This article presents an orderly analysis of the issues courts need to
resolve first before deciding whether inter-collegiate athletics can constitute
a major life activity for the athlete. Part II starts by introducing the
Rehabilitation Act and the difficulties encountered by the courts since its
18 The objective test as to the individual is the same as the subjective test applied by the courts.
See Pahulu, 897 F.Supp at 1392,1393; Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481. The courts applying the subjective
standard actually are applying objective factors as to the individual. Anytime this Comment addresses
the objective test as to the individual, it refers to the subjective test as applied by the courts.
19 See Pahulu, 897 F.Supp at 1392; Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480-82.
20 See Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., 694 F.Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); See also Scharff
v. Frank, 791 F.Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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passage in interpreting its provisions. This Part discusses how the courts
assess claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act. Part III analyzes the
standard used in determining whether an inter-collegiate athlete is othenvise
qualified. This Part also analyzes the arguments the universities and athletes
will make in addressing whether a university can reasonably accommodate
an athlete. Part IV analyzes the objective test as to the individual and the
objective test as to the average person, as applied by courts in determining
whether inter-collegiate athletics is a major life activity. Part V contends that
the objective test as to the individual is the correct standard to be used in
determining whether athletics is a major ife activity. Finally, the article
concludes with an overview of the present situation and the need to resolve
these disputed issues.
I1. THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE DIFFICULTIES
ENCOUNTERED IN INTERPRETING ITS PROVISIONS SINCE ITS
PASSAGE
A. The Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed for the express purpose of
providing "even handed treatment of qualified handicapped persons and to
prevent discrimination because of a perceived inability to function in a
particular program."2' The Act was "meant to enable handicapped persons
to achieve their full productive capability, foster their self-sufficiency and
independence, and integrate them into the community."22 In order to
prevail under the Rehabilitation Act, an individual must prove that: (1) he
is disabled within the meaning of the Act, (2) he is otherwise qualified for
the position sought, (3) he has been excluded from the position solely
because of his disability, and (4) the position exists as part of a program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.23 Requirements one and two
are 'hurdles' the athletes must overcome, while requirements three and four
are more easily satisfied.
21 34 C.F.R. S 104.47 (1997).
2 Donald Jay Olenick, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 Afier South-
eastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 173 (1980), citing to 29 U.S.C. S 701 (1976) (current version at
Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-602, S 122(a), 92 Stat. at 2984) (statement of purpose); S. REP. NO. 1135, 92d CONG., 2d Sess.
3 (1972); S. REP. No. 318, supra note 6, at 3-4, 18-19, [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2077-
79,2091-92; S. REP. NO. 1297, supra note 3, at 31-47, 55-58, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6382-97,6405-08; 119 CONG. REc. 24,586 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); 118 Cong. Rec. 9495
(1972) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 119 CONG. REC. 24,566,24,589 (1973).
23 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1997).
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With respect to requirement one, 29 U.S.C. Section 706(8) (B) 24 defines
when an individual could be considered disabled. An individual with a
disability is:
[A]ny person who: (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment.5
The regulations provide, in essence, that "a 'physical impairment' is any
physiological disorder or condition that affects a bodily system.1
26
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act define major life activity as basic
functions of life "such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."27
With respect to requirement two, the regulations define a qualified
handicapped individual as one "who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation" in the educational
program 28 and an otherwise qualified individual as one "who is able to meet
all of the program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 9
B. Dfficulties Encountered Since Its Passage
Knapp and Pahulu have directly addressed the issue of whether athletics
can be considered a major life activity for inter-collegiate athlete's such that
a university's refusal to allow them to compete because of the risk of possible
24 29 U.S.C. S 706(8)(B)(1997).
25 Id.
26 See William C. Tausigg, Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and The Recognition OfObesiyAsA Disability
Under The Rehabilitation Act And-The Americans With Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REV. 927, 936 (1994); See
45 C.F.R. S 84.3G) (2)(i); 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(h) (Physical impairment means "any physiological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive genito-urinary; hematic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45
C.F.R. S 84.3(j)(2)(i). In addition, "in Appendix A to the health and Human Services ('HHS')
regulations, 'Analysis of Final Regulation,' HHS expands on its definition of impairment by stating that
it includes 'drug addiction and alcoholism' and 'any condition which is mental or physical but whose
precise nature is not at present known.' 45 C.F.R. S 84, App. A, Subpart A(3)." Tausigg, William C.
"Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals And The Recognition Of Obesity As A Disability Under The Rehabilitation
Act And The Americans With Disabilities Act", 35 B.C. L. REv. 927, 963 n.80 (1994).
27 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997).
28 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(k)(3) (1997).
29 Id.
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future injury from a physical condition would be a substantial limitation on
a major life activity. These cases, however, do not fit neatly into the
Rehabilitation Act analysis.30  For instance, the possibility of a heart or
neurological problem on the playing field is not a continuing problem like
common disabilities such as blindness or paralysis. Whenever an athlete
with a heart or neurological disorder is competing, but not suffering the
disorder, he is, in essence, not disabled at that time.31 However, the athlete's
disorder does pose a constant risk against all major life activities if the feared
injury actually results in substantial injury or death.32 Since the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act, many courts have attempted to define the boundaries of
what is meant by a substantial limitation and a major life activity.
With respect to substantial limitations, the Department of Health and
Human Services openly acknowledged in commentary after the regulations
were passed that it "did not believe that a definition is possible at this time. 3
Although the Department defined major life activity, claims of disability in the
context of athletics were not easily classified into the Code's enumeration.
34
The two major life activities Pahulu and Knapp noted athletics could fall
under are learning and working3 5 However, the courts focus their opinions
on learning.-6 In Pahulu, a college student was disqualified from participating
30 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 479.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 34 C.F.R. S104,App.A at372; 84 C.F.R. S84, App. Aat355; Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1392-93.
34 See Frederick B. Weber, Pahulu v. Univ. of Kansas, 6 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. 271,
273 (1996) (stating "[t]he court had no trouble concluding that Plaintiffs condition was a physical
impairment. The real issue in the court's analysis of whether or not Plaintiff was 'disabled' within the
meaning of the Act, was whether or not playing college football was a major life activity)."
35 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1391; Knapp, 101 F.3d at 479. See also Weber, supra note 34, at 273,
stating "A recurring theme in the cases and regulations was that major life activities included both
learning and working."
36 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1391; Knapp at 479. This article will limit its analysis to learning, as did
the courts in Knapp and Pahulu, because it is the most viable argument for the athletes. Although the
argument can be made that athletics is in and of itself a major life activity (this is rejected in Knapp at
480), this was not argued by either Knapp or Pahulu and involves an analysis not within the scope of this
article. However, the possibility of raising the argument that athletics may constitute working, another
enumerated major life activity warrants sufficient importance to briefly address the issue.
For many athletes, choosing to compete in professional athletics is one of the most important
career moves in their lives. Athletics has become for some their source of livelihood. In determining
whether inter-collegiate athletics constitutes working, an argument may be made, as did the district court
opinion in Knapp, that the individual must prove that he has a substantial economic interest that affects
his ability to earn a livelihood. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 1996WL 495559 (N.D.Ill. 1996), rev'd
in Knapp, 101 F.3d 473. The district court held that "[i] n order for this Court to interfere in the internal
operations of Northwestern University, the NCAA or the Big 10 Conference, Knapp must establish a
substantial economic interest that affects his ability to earn a livelihood." Id. at *2. Although the district
court opinion was overruled, the Court ofAppeals does not address the criteria in the university-athletics
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in athletics by a team physician upon discovery of a congenitally narrow
cervical canal. There was a high risk that there may be a repeat occurrence
with potentially severe neurological injury. The court held that athletics
might constitute a major life activity for the individual athlete under the
category of learning. In contrast, the court in Knapp prevented a student-
athlete from playing on the basketball team because of a heart disorder.
There was a small risk of future injury. The court held that athletics is not,
in and of itself, a major life activity.
The courts are not only split on the issue of whether inter-collegiate
athletics can constitute a major life activity, but also on whether athletics in
general can constitute a major life activity. In Doe v. Dolton Elementary School
District,37 the court viewed contact sports as a major life activity for a child
with A.I.D.S.38 However, in Sharff v. Frank,39 the court held that a postal
worker with a history of musculoskeletal injuries was not substantially im-
paired in a major life activity when she could not participate in competitive
sporting events and other unusually demanding physical activities.
40
Courts have also been split on whether to apply an objective standard as
to the individual, or an objective standard as to the average person, in
determining whether athletics constitute a major life activity. In Dutton v.
setting for establishing whether athletics can constitute working and no other case law address this issue
in the fact scenario presented in this article.
Case law argues against classifying the possibility of a professional career in athletics as a
present economic interest. For instance, it is well established that "[w] hile participation in intercollegiate
athletics has been recognized as a training ground for a professional basketball career, the possibility of
obtaining that professional basketball career is too speculative to even constitute a present economic
interest." See Knapp, 1996WL 495559 *2 (the lower court working analysis was not addressed, in the court
of appeals), citing to Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F.Supp. 602, 611(C.D. III. 1987); Colorado Seminary v.
NCAA, 417 F.Supp. 885, 895 (D.Co. 1976), affd 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
However, the argument can be made that Hank Gathers was a promisingyoung athlete whose
possibility of a professional career in athletics was not mere speculation. It was most likely going to
happen. Thus, in determining whether athletics can constitute the major life activity of working, the
courts should apply a case-by-case determination. This determination involves weighing objective
factors specific to the individual in assessing the possibility of a future career in athletics. The end result
will be that only a relatively few athlete's can claim that athletics constitutes working for them under the
present economic interest argument.
Another possible argument for classifying athletics as working is that an athletes scholarship
and, consequently, financial well-being is dependent on his performing on the team. Athletics
constitutes working because the scholarship money is given in return for a service provided through the
employer, namely, the university. This was not an issue in the two cases because athletes were allowed
to keep their scholarships.
37 Doe, 694 F.Supp. 440.
38 Id. at 445.
39 Scharff, 791 F.Supp. 182.
40 Id. at 182.
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Johnson County Bd. Of County Commissioners,4' the court held that a
"[p] laintiff s status as a disabled individual is a highly fact-sensitive issue,
requiring an individualized inquiry and a case-by-case determination.
" 42
Pahulu extends this reasoning by applying an objective standard as to the
individual when determining the underlying issue of whether athletics can
constitute a major life activity. Knapp, though, favors an objective test as to
the average person in resolving the issue.43 As in Knapp, the court in Welsh
v. City of Tulsa, Okla.,' also appears to adopt an objective standard as to the
average person in defining major life activity by holding that the major life
activity of working does not mean working in a job of one's choice.4
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an athlete must be deemed otherwise
qualified and capable of being reasonably accommodated before the courts
have to address which standard to apply in determining whether athletics is
a major life activity.
II. OTHERWISE QUALIFIED AND THE ROLE OF REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
A. The Standard Used In Determining Whether An Individual Is Othenvise
Qualfied
It is well accepted that whether a person is othenvise qualified under the
Rehabilitation Act is primarily a factual inquiry.' Pahulu and Knapp
recognize the right of the university to determine that an individual is not
otherwise medically qualified to play. Knapp held that the role of the court
was to "make sure that the decision-maker (the university) has reasonably
considered and relied upon sufficient evidence specific to the individual and
the potential injury, not to determine on its own which evidence it believes
is more persuasive. "  The courts held that universities are only required to
make a rational and reasonable determination that the athletes were not
othenvise qualified to perform the activity when the possibility of future injury
exists.
41 Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 859 F.Supp. 498 (D.Kan. 1994).
42 Id. at 506.
43 Knapp, 101 F.3d 473, 481.
44 Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992).
45 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481, citing to Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417.
46 See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (With respect to the otherwise
qualified analysis, the Supreme Court stated that, "[t]o answer this question (whether Arline was
otherwise qualified) in most cases, the district court will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and
make appropriate findings of fact." Id. at 287. See also Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1394, citing to McGee v.
Rice, 21 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).
47 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484.
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In determining whether someone is othenvise qualified, the risk of injury
can be a decisive issue. In School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme
Court held that the inquiry into whether someone is otherwise qualified
should include "[fJ acts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the
state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk. . ., (b) the
duration of the risk..., [and] (c) the severity of the risk. ... .,48
In the context of inter-collegiate athletes, Knapp applies the standard
used in Montolete v. Bolger.49 Applying Arline's reasoning, the court in
Montolete held that "in order to exclude such individuals, there must be a
showing of a reasonable probability of substantial harm."50 The court
further held that the employer:I
must gather all relevant information regarding the applicant's work
history and medical history, and independently assess both the
probability and severity of potential injury. This involves, of course,
a case-by-case analysis of the applicant and the particular job.5'
In Pahulu and Knapp, the courts held that the severity of the potential
injury was high, namely death ,52 and, therefore, the athletes were otherwise
qualified.
Because it is a case-by-case analysis, there is the possibility that an athlete
may be deemed otherwise qualified; thus bringing into issue whether
athletics can be considered a major life activity. Even in Knapp, the court
acknowledged another team physician reviewing the same information
available to those at Northwestern University might reasonably decide that
Knapp met all the physical qualifications for playing on an inter-collegiate
basketball team. 3
In addition to weighing risk of injury and other pertinent factual
determinations in determining whether an individual is othenvise qualified,
courts must also take into account whether an athlete can be reasonably
accommodated. Pahulu and Knapp failed to demonstrate the importance of
the reasonable accommodation analysis to the otherwise qualified analysis
byglossing over the issue, ignoring real costs in accommodating the athletes.
48 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
49 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
so Id.; Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1422.
st Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483; Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1422.
s2 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
53 Id.
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B. Reasonable Accommodation Analyzed
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis and School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, demonstrated the importance of the
reasonable accommodation analysis in the university-student setting and the
employment setting.5' Assuming the educational institution abides by the
regulations' requirements for auxiliary aids, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act does not impose a requirement that an educational institution lower or
effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped
individual.5" For the athletes to prevail, the modifications cannot
fundamentally alter the essential nature of the program. 6
In light of the importance the regulations and the Supreme Court accord
to the issue of reasonable accommodation, Pahulu and Knapp fail to fully
address whether the universities can reasonably accommodate the respective
athletes. In Pahulu, the court does not discuss the issue of reasonable
accommodation while in Knapp the court simply assumes that the athlete
can be reasonably accommodated. The court in Knapp cites to School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 7 where the Supreme Court stated that "when a
handicapped person is not able to perform the essential functions of thejob,
the court must also consider whether any reasonable accommodation by the
employer would enable the handicapped person to perform those
functions." 8 The court, though, merely mentions that the only apparent
accommodation is an internal defibrillator5 9 Although it cites to Davis, it
does not address its reasonable accommodation analysis. Further, Pahulu
and Knapp do not address whether individual costs in accommodating the
athletes, such as the purchase of emergency equipment specific to the
individual athletes disorder, the presence of emergency personnel at the
sporting event, and the possible alteration in the manner in which team
practice is conducted would fundamentally alter the essential nature of the
athletic program.
Section 84.44(a) of the Code provides modification guidelines for post-
secondary institutions in academic programs should a handicapped student
need such measures. The measures that may be taken by these institutions
include "modifications in the length of time permitted for degree
requirements; substitutions of specific courses required for a particular
54 Olenick, supra note 22, at 179.
55 Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.
56 Id. at 410. See also Olenick, supra note 22, at 189.
57 Arline, 480 U.S. 273.
58 See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 482, citing to Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
59 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
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degree, and adaptation of the method of instruction in specific courses.
0
In addition, examples of auxiliary aids "include taped texts, classroom
equipment adapted for use by students with manual impairments, and other
similar services and actions.'
The universities may argue that should the post-secondary institution
regulations apply in the university-athlete setting, the required modifications
for accommodating the athletes would fall outside the regulations'
requirements for reasonable accommodation. The Code provides that
"individually prescribed devices.., or other devices ofa personal nature" are
not required.62 Universities would have to provide special equipment, such
as an internal defibrillator in Knapp, 63 in the immediate vicinity of the athlete
during practice and at game time in case the physical impairment flares up
while the athlete is playing. In addition, emergency personnel presently may
have to be present during every game.
Accommodating the individual may also change the essential nature of
the program. The whole team would have to stop the program and modify
practice schedules accordingly for any close calls the athlete may undergo.
For instance, during basketball practice athletes are required to work
together in unison as a team. An athlete with a heart defect may feel he
needs to slow down, thus affecting the practice session. The program would
accordingly have to adjust and work around the athlete's disorder. The
result would be a less efficient practice in order to accommodate one
athlete.'
60 45 C.F.R. S 84.44(a) (1997); See Olenick, supra note 22, at 179.
61 45 C.F.R. S 84.44 (1)(a),(d),(2) (1997).
62 45 C.F.R. S 84.44(d)(a) (1997) ("Recipients need not provide attendants, individually
prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature.").
See Olenick, supra note 22, at 179.
63 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
64 Another possible argument the universities may make is that third parties, such as coaches,
athletes, parents, and friends may be in a constant state of fear that the problem may flare up. If the
problem flares up, many will have to suffer the shock of witnessing an injury, or even a death.
The Supreme Court has expressly forbidden the consideration of such factors in the S 504
analysis. The Court in Arline stated, "Congress's desire to prohibit discrimination based on the effects
of a person's handicap may have on others was evident from the inception of the Act." Arline, 480 U.S.
at n.9, 1129. The Court further stated that:
[F]or example, Representative Vanik, whose remarks constitute "a primary signpost on the
road toward interpreting the legislative history of s. 404," Choate v. Alexander, 469 U.S. 287
(1985), cited as an example of improper handicap discrimination a case in which "a court
ruled that a cerebral palsied child, who was not a physical threat and was academically
competitive, should be excluded from public school, because his teacher claimed his physical
appearance produced a nauseating effect" on his classmates.
117 Cong.Rec. S 45974 (1971). See also 118 CONG. REC. 36761 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Mondale) (a
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The athletes, on the other hand, may explain away these costs as
peripheral to the real cost at issue here, the inability of an athlete to
participate in an activity that he values. In addition, the costs imposed on the
university are well within the guidelines of 45 C.F.R. 84.44 because all that
is required is minimal protection from injury. The added equipment costs
are standard auxiliary aids. Just as a ramp is used to accommodate a disabled
individual confined to a wheelchair, so can an internal defibrillator be
provided to an individual with a heart problem. The equipment is not a
personal device as all individuals possessing such a disorder use it. Such a
device would most likely not have disqualified the nurse applicant in Davis.
Athletes may also argue that emergency personnel routinely attend sporting
events, and any specific equipment necessary to meet the individual athlete's
needs will not impose a significant additional cost. Therefore, their presence
at a sporting event is not an unusual occurrence that would impose an
additional cost.
Furthermore, accommodating the athletes will not modify the essential
nature of the program. First, the disorder will most likely not "flare UP.
"65
Second, should the disorder flare up, this would be a sporadic and rare
occurrence that will not change the essence of practices and competition.
Just as adaptation of the method of instruction in specific courses may be
imposed on the University,' so can adaptation of the manner of practice.
In addition, there are numerous cases throughout any given year of athletes
suffering unexpected incidents of sprains, tears, and broken bones during
practice.67
Thus, the possibility that an athlete can be reasonably accommodated
and be considered otherwise qualified, necessitates analysis of the standard
that should be applied in determining whether inter-collegiate athletics can
be considered a major life activity.
woman 'crippled by arthritis' was denied a job not because she could not do the work but because
"college trustees [thought] 'normal students shouldn't see her'"); Id. at 525 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey); c. Macgregor, Some Psycho-Sodal Problems Associated with Facial Deformities, 16 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 629 (1961). Arline, 480 U.S. at n.9, 1129.
65 SeeKnapp, 101 F.3d at 483 ("In regard tothe probability ofinjury, Dr.John H. McAnulty, one
of Knapp's experts, testified that the annual risk of death to Knapp as a result of his cardiac condition
under a worst-case scenario is 2.4 percent and that playing intercollegiate basketball would elevate this
annual risk to 2.93 percent, or t in 34."). The universities may argue against the athlete's contention of
the small risk of injury and say that these statistics are not worth the gamble.
6 45 C.F.R. S 84.44(a)(1997). See Olenick, supra note 22, at 179.
67 In addition, as mentioned above, in Martin, 1998 WIL 67529, the court held that under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the requested accommodation ofa golfcart to assist a professional golfer
with a congenital deformity in which his right leg is severely atrophied and weakened during competition
was eminently reasonable. Id. at *12.
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IV. THE OBJECTIVE TESTS AND RESPECTIVE MODELS
A. The Objective Tests Presented and Compared
Before analyzingwhether inter-collegiate athletics is a major life activity,
courts should decide whether to apply an objective test as to the individual
or an objective test as to the average person. The Rehabilitation Act, along
with its regulations, "give little guidance regarding whether the
determination of what constitutes a major life activity turns on an objective
standard (objective standard as to the average person) or subjective standard
(objective standard as to the individual person)."6s Knowing the differences
behind the arguments for applying each test is important because it provides
a basis from which to identify the arguments on either side of the issue of
whether inter-collegiate athletics can constitute a major Ife activity.
The objective test as to the individual finds support in the accepted
notion that whether an individual is disabled is an individualized inquiry,
determined on a case-by-case basis. 69 Major Ife activities are defined in a more
individualized manner during the substantial limitation analysis pursuant to the
regulation's definition of disability.70 Specifically, the fact-finder must look
at whether the physical impairment is a significant burden to the particular
person.
The objective test as to the individual implicitly acknowledges that inter-
collegiate athletics may be a major life activity for some individuals. It is
based on the simple premise that for individual-athletes, athletics can
constitute learning. A factual inquiry is necessary in applying this test, as the
courts must measure the importance of athletics for the individual athlete.
In contrast, in determining whether athletics is a major life activity, the
objective test as to the average person looks at objective factors as applied to
the average person.7' This test allows the courts to prevent athletics from
being classified as a major life activityfor everyone.
Knapp applies the objective test as to the average person and cites to the
definition of major life activity in the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Rehabilitation Act.72 The court held that the activities mentioned (i.e.
walking, breathing, learning, and working) were basic functions, "not more
68 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480. See infa note 18.
69 Dutton, 859 F.Supp. at 506.
70 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481.
71 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480.
72 34 C.F.R. S 104.3(j)(2)(ii)(1997); 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(j)(2)(ii)(1997).
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specific ones such as being an astronaut, working as a firefighter, driving a
race car, or learning by playing in Big Ten basketball."
73
Similarly, those advocating an objective test as to the average person
contend that to be considered a major life activity the activity has to be
universally performed.74 Activities that are frequently or universally
performed implies a narrow interpretation of the Code's definition of major
life activities.
75
The defendant in Abbott v. Bragdon,76 where an HIV-positive woman
sued a dentist claiming his refusal to treat her in his dental office violated the
Americans with Disability Act (ADA), adopts this reasoning in arguing the
term major life activity does not embody lifestyle choices or activities that
people choose not to do, in other words, performed infrequently.77 He
argued and cited authority supporting that many choose not to have children
and thus childbearing is not a major life activity.78
This argument was held deficient in Abbott for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, held that the
definition of major life activity pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, was
accorded "a broad definition, one not limited to so-called 'traditional
handicaps."' 79 Use of the words "such as" clearly conveys the hypothesis
that the definition merely lists examples, and is not meant to be all-
inclusive.s' In addition, if Congress would have intended that the definition
be construed narrowly, "it surely would have written new, more restrictive
language instead ofborrowing a descriptive phrase notable for its breadth.""
Secondly, there is either no requirement that an activity be performed
frequently or universally to be considered a major life activity.s2  The
regulations convey no legislative intent that frequency or universality be a
73 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481.
74 Id. at 480; see also Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940-41 (lst Cir. 1997), cert. granted in 522
U.S. 991, vacated in 524 U.S. 624.
75 Abbott, 107 F.3d 934, 941.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 SeeAbbott, 107 F.3d at 940, citing to Krauel v. Iowa Med. Ctr., 915 F.Supp. 102, 106 n. 1 (S.D.
Iowa 1995) aft'd, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[Slome people choose not to have children, but all people
care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, and work, unless a
handicap or illness limits them.").
79 Abbott, 107 F.3d. at 940, citing to Arine, 480 U.S. at n.5, 280.
8o Id. at 940. The court's reasoning in Abbott, although in support of the objective test as to the
individual, may be extended to support the reasoning that athletics is major life activity in and of itself.
However, as mentioned above, that issue is beyond the scope of this article.
81 Abbott, 107 F.3dat941. See also Doe v. Kohinast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.Supp. 1310,1320 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
8 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
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limiting factor in classifying an activity as a major life activity.83 Even some
of the enumerated activities in the regulation's definition are not performed
universally. In fact, "[m]ost acts that human beings perform - or refrain
from performing- have elements ofvolition."4 For instance, not everyone
chooses to work. This is a lifestyle choice for many rich individuals. Even
speaking is not universally chosen as part of one's life as many monks have
taken a vow of silence.8s
Proponents of the objective test as to the average person also rely on the
regulations pursuant to the equal employment provisions of the ADA. In
Pahulu, the defendants relied on the objective test as to the average person
using the ADA's definition of"substantially limits"' to demonstrate that the
major life activity must pertain to the general public. The Pahulu court held,
however, that the case it was dealing with did not involve employment
disability discrimination and accordingly, the ADA regulations were not
applicable.'
B. Models of Preventing Discrimination
The objective test as to the individual and the objective test as to the
average person lead to two different models for preventing discrimination
83 Id.
8 Id.
8s Id.
86 The definition states:
"(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity... (3) With respect to the major life activity of working -- (i)
[tjhe term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. S 1630.20)(1994). See Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1392.
s7 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1392. In addition, as the leading proponent of the objective test as to
the average person in the context of inter-collegiate athletics, the Knapp court, argued that the major life
activity of working does not necessarily include working at the job of one's choice. Knapp, 101 F.3d at
481-82, citing to Welsh, 977 F.2d 1415. This argument implies that participating in inter-collegiate
athletics is not a major life activity simply because one can compete in the activity of one's choice.
With respect to the Welsh argument, referred to in Kanpp, Pahulu noted that the cases where
the courts interchangeably applied the regulations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA were in the
context of employment discrimination, not the university-student setting. Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1393,
citing to McGee, 21 F.3d 1121; Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1011 (1994); Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 322, 325 n. 1 (N.D.Miss. 1995);
Dunon, 859 F.Supp. at 504. The court also stated that no authority was presented that authorized
"reliance upon ADA regulations in all Rehabilitation Act contexts." Knapp, 101 F.3d at 1393.
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against disabled athletes. Analyzing both models are important in that they
demonstrate the standard of reasoning courts have and will apply in
resolving discrimination claims in the university-athlete context. The
objective test as to the individual, favors a "Be All You Can Be" model for
preventing discrimination, while the objective test as to the average person,
favors a practical model. The objective test as to the individual argues that
objective factors as to the individual allow him to compete in the sport and
achieve his full potential. The ultimate focus is on the athlete. In the "Be
All You Can Be" model, the individual's interests take priority over the
interests of the university, which are viewed as a limiting factor. This model
favors subordinating the costs associated with reasonably accommodating
the individual-athlete to the value the student accords to objective factors
associated with competing on an inter-collegiate team.
On the other hand, the objective test as to the average person weighs all
the variables in a more practical manner. The ultimate focus is on the
average person and the added costs in allowing athletes to compete. The
average person does not typically value competition as much as the
individual-athlete bringing suit. The athlete takes on the lesser degree of
value accorded to the average person. This practical approach also weighs
heavily the costs associated with reasonably accommodating the athlete.
V. THE OBJECTIVE TEST AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL:
THE BETTER CHOICE
A. Defnitional Approach
Having presented the tests used for determining whether athletics is a
major life activity and their respective models for preventing discrimination,
this part demonstrates how the objective test as to the individual and the "Be
All You Can Be" model for preventing discrimination is the correct standard
for resolving whether athletics can be considered a major life activity for a
student-athlete.
Before analyzing the athlete's claim that athletics is a major life activity
because it constitutes learning, this part will present a purely definitional
analysis of the term major life activity, as well as interpret the scope of the
regulation's definition of the term.
In Abbott v. Bragdon,s8 the court, in rejecting commonly used arguments
against classifying reproduction and all that activity encompasses as a major
life activity, 9 used a definitional approach in interpreting the term's
88 Abbott, 107 F.3d 934.
89 Id. at 941.
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meaning. The Supreme Court has turned to dictionary definitions in similar
situations to that in Abbott.9° The court in Abbot held that it was obliged to
construe the term's meaning in accordance with its ordinary meaning since
there was no statutory definition.9' The term major is defined 2 as meaning
"greater than others in importance or rank."93 The term is also defined94 as
meaning "greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest."95 The court in
Abbott correctly held that an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric of
major life activity is determined by its significance.
This article argues that athletics should constitute a major life activity for
an athlete who can prove that the benefits associated with participating in
athletics' are of significant importance in the athlete's life. This leads us to
analyze how inter-collegiate athletics can be significant enough in the life of
a college athlete to constitute learning.
B. Learning From Athletics
Many virtues are learned merely by participating in sports. Athletics can
educate an individual in a variety of ways. Many student-athletes acquire
virtues that are not always so easily attained by experiencing the rigors of
athletics. Common virtues athletes claim they have learned from athletics
include discipline, perseverance, and how to be a team player.
For instance, the athlete in Pahulu stated that through football "he has
learned to be a team player; he has learned discipline; he has met people and
been inspired to want a better life for himself; he has learned to care about
his appearance; and his grades improved once he started playing football."96
In addition to Pahulu's own testimony, Pahulu's father testified to the
educational and growth benefits Pahulu acquired from participating in
sports.Y Pahulu's coach and a defendant also both testified "athletics is an
important component of learning.""
Knapp also felt that he learned a great deal from athletics. He stated that
"he does not believe he can obtain confidence, dedication, leadership,
90 Id. at 940; citing to Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223,229 (1993).
91 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
92 Id. at 939-40, citing to AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARYOFTHEENGLISH LANGUAGE 1084
(3d ed. 1992).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 939-40, citing to WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 718 (1989).
95 Id.
% Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1393. See also Case Law Development, Education, High School Sports; Age
Limit; Learning Disabilities, 19 MENTAL & PHYSICAl DISABILITY L. REP. 770, 771 (1995).
97 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1393.
98 Id.
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perseverance, discipline, and teamwork in any better way."99 Knapp's
statement depicts an individual that values athletics so much that, to him,
it is the best means to learn the virtues that guide an individual to success
not only in athletics, but also in other areas of one's life. In light of this, the
frequency and universality of the activity approach that Knapp applied in its
reasoning warrant scrutiny.l°°
In strictly interpreting the regulatory definition, the court in Knapp held
that athletics is not a basic function such as walking, breathing, and speaking.
Although athletics can be a learning experience for many, not everyone
values athletics in the same light as walking, breathing, and speaking. Not
everyone can afford to go to college and play inter-collegiate athletics.'0 '
Furthermore, preventing an athlete from playing inter-collegiate sports does
not mean that they have not learned. Competing in inter-collegiate sports
therefore "cannot be held out as a necessary part of learning for all
students. " '°2
The problem with this reasoning is that the ability to learn through other
avenues does not preclude the avenue in question from being classified as a
major life activity. Many areas of learning are not necessary for an
individual's learning process, but they are still part of the learning process.
Someone who has a learning disability can have a hard time learning the
object of the disability, but still learn other things. Courts view the
individual as disabled because of the importance that disability has had on
that person's life. This is consistent withJohn Rawl's view that:
[A] person's good is determined by what is for him the most
rational long-term plan of life given reasonable favorable
circumstances. A man is happy when he is more or less successfully
in the way of carrying out this plan. To put it briefly, the good is the
satisfaction of rational desire. We are to suppose, then, that each
individual has a rational plan of life drawn up subject to the
conditions that confront him. This plan is designed to permit the
harmonious satisfaction of his interests. It schedules activities so
that various desires can be fulfilled without interference. It is
arrived at by rejecting other plans that are either less likely to
succeed or do not provide for such an inclusive attainment of aims.
Given the alternatives available, a rational plan is one which cannot
99 Knapp, 101 F.3d at 479.
100 Id. at 480-81.
1o Id. at 480.
102 Id.
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be improved upon; there is no other plan which, taking everything
into account, would be preferable. °3
For athletes such as Pahulu and Knapp, a life plan includes playing inter-
collegiate athletics, and there is no better avenue for them to learn the
virtues athletics teaches them. As long as athletics is an important part of the
athlete's learning process, there is nothing in the regulation's definition to
suggest he cannot claim a disability. Knapp acknowledges the ability to learn
from athletics, but adds its own limitations for claiming disability under
learning.
The court in Knapp also followed the Sixth Circuit's reasoning inJasany
v. United States1' 4 in holding that athletics cannot constitute learning for the
athlete because the terms major life activity and substantial limitation must be
viewed as a whole, not separately.'Os The court in Jasany held, "An
impairment that affects only a narrow range ofjobs can be regarded either
as not reaching a major life activity or as not substantially limiting one. " ' 6
As mentioned above, Knapp reasoned that the athlete's ability to learn was
not substantially limited because there were other avenues from which he
could learn. Knapp kept his scholarship, and was allowed to participate in
all other academic and extra-curricular activities.1°7 Knapp could possibly
have learned the same virtues if he played as part of the team in a non-
competitive manner.10 The logical extension of the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning is that inter-collegiate athletics is not a major life activity because
it does not substantially limit an individual's overall ability to learn.
However, there is no basis in the regulations for the contention that
major life activity and substantial limitation need to be viewed as a whole.' 9 In
addition, case law directly goes against Knapp's reasoning that major life activity
and substantial limitation need to be viewed as a whole. Pahulu held that inter-
collegiate athletics may constitute a major life activity but also held that there
was no substantial limitation 1 °
Regardless of Knapp's flawed reasoning, athletics is viewed as an
important part of an-individual's learning process. Courts have recognized
"the importance of physical education and participation in athletic activities
103 JOHN A. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 92-92 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA 1971).
104 Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
10s Knapp, 101 F.3d at 479, 480.
106 Id., citing toJasany, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 n.3.
107 Id. at 477.
10s Id. at 480.
109 The regulation merely states: " [a] substantial limitation on a major life activity," 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1997).
110 Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. at 1393.
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on American college campuses is well accepted... [I]nter-collegiate, club,
or intramural sports sponsored by the college must also allow participation
by disabled students on a non-discriminatory basis.""' In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,"2 the Supreme Court recognized athletics as
part of the educational process in the context of racial integration and the
enforcement of Title IV.113 In Brenden v. Independent School District,114 the
court held that discrimination in high school interscholastic athletics
constitutes discrimination in education."5 In addition, the regulations serve
to guarantee "disabled students the often intangible benefits of nonacademic
social interaction. The provision of physical education and athletic
programs,.. . is particularly important."" 6
Thus, athletics clearly has an important role in the learning process of
many athletes. Applying the objective test as to the average person, a
representation of the average person formed by an overwhelming majority
of individuals who do not partake in inter-collegiate athletics, would
unjustly minimize the importance of inter-collegiate athletics in the
claimant's learning process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having presented the objective test as to the individual, the objective test
as to the average person, and the avenues by which athletes may argue that
inter-collegiate athletics constitutes learning, this article concludes that the
most equitable and just standard to apply is the objective test as to the
individual. Inter-collegiate athletics may be considered a major life activity
because of its importance to individual athletes.
The Rehabilitation Act applies to those specific individuals who have
been unjustly prevented from participating in an activity of significant
importance to them because of a physical impairment. The objective test as
to the average person does not live up to the purpose of the Rehabilitation
Act. The objective test as to the average person measures an activity's
viability as a major life activity in comparison to the average person. There
is no doubt that the average person values "breathing, seeing, hearing,
ill Id. at 1391, citing to L.ARA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW S 7.11 (1992).
112 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
113 Id.
114 Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
11s Id. at 1298.
116 Timothy M. Cook & FrankJ. Laski, Beyond Davis: Equality of Opportunityfor Higher Education
for Disabled Students Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 15 HARv.C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 415, 459 (1980).
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speaking, and walking."' 17 These activities assume great importance to the
average person and to every individual.
However, learning and working are inherently more versatile and
flexible than the other enumerated major life activities. The other basic
enumerated major life activities lead to the same result regardless of whether
the objective test as to the individual or average person is applied. An
individual, though, has the freedom to choose how to learn and how to
work. This requires the fact-finder to assess all the facts in deciding whether
a particular form of learning or working falls under the enumeration for that
specific individual. Thus, in depriving an athlete of the chance to prove the
importance of the activity as to himself, a court is not according the
regulatory definition of major life activity a "broad interpretation,"'" flexible
to the particular circumstances.
Many who excel in life because they have learned discipline and hard-
work attribute their success to the virtues they learned through participating
in athletics. As to them athletics has assumed such a level of significance in
their lives that it becomes a major life activity. This key word is becomes,
which in and of itself implies an individualized determination.
In summation, case law addressing whether an individual-athlete has a
claim against a university for preventing him from participating in inter-
collegiate athletics because of a physical condition that may pose a risk of
injury to himself or others in the future is in a state of disarray. The two
leading opinions on the issue, Knapp and Pahulu, cannot agree on important
issues in the analysis. Both cases fail to adequately frame their opinions by
not discussing at length the various considerations in reasonably
accommodating the respective athlete. Until these issues are adequately
addressed and resolved, the athlete who sufficiently values competing in
inter-collegiate athletics so that it is a major life activityfor him risks being at
the mercy of a court that chooses to apply the objective standard as to the
average person.
117 See note 27.
11 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940, citing to Arline, 480 U.S. at n.5, 280.
